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Highlights
• The EU regulatory response to the crisis has been generally slower than in
the United States, for four main reasons: swifter financial crisis management
and resolution in the US; structural differences in legislative processes; the
EU’s front-loading of institutional reform, most notably the creation of Euro-
pean Supervisory Authorities; and the timetable of renewal of the European
Commission in 2009-10. 
• The EU has nevertheless initiated or completed significant regulatory initia-
tives in terms of banking, market structures, private equity and hedge
funds, rating agencies and accounting. 
• Major further challenges loom however, including ensuring a smooth start to
the activities of the newly created European authorities; creating a sustaina-
ble framework for cross-border banking crisis management and resolution;
and the gradual establishment of a consistent financial regulatory philoso-
phy for the EU, to underpin market integration.
This Policy Contribution was first published under the title ‘Some thoughts on EU
financial reforms’by the Brookings Institution, following the Brookings-Heinrich
Böll Foundation Seminar In the Wake of the Crisis: Macroeconomic Dilemmas and
Financial Regulation Challenges For Europe, America and the World, held in Wash-
ington DC on 1 December 2010. Brookings’ permission to republish is gratefully
acknowledged. Nicolas Véron (n.veron@bruegel.org) is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel
and a Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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wanting. As a consequence, EU stress tests have
not thus far performed the function of triage that
would have effectively triggered the recapitalisa-
tion and restructuring that are arguably indispen-
sible to put the European banking system back on
a sustainable track. A third wave of EU-wide stress
tests is envisaged in early 2011.
Needless to mention, in 2010 the sovereign credit
crisis that started in Greece and spread in the euro
area came in addition to the unresolved banking
crisis. These two crises – sovereign and banking –
have reinforced one another. The Greek crisis
accentuated the fragility of the banking system,
but banking weakness also prevented the restruc-
turing of Greek debt, which would arguably have
brought it to a prompt resolution. Conversely, the
aggravation of the banking crisis in Ireland after
the summer of 2010 played a key role in precipi-
tating the Irish sovereign crisis in November. Sim-
ilar concerns weigh very negatively on Spain. By
comparison, the US ‘foreclosuregate’ has not
resulted, at the time of writing, in a major disrup-
tion of the US financial system. While there is vivid
debate on the long-term sustainability of US public
finances, this has not resulted in short-term
financing concerns for the US government. The
bottom line is that the US was able to start its dis-
cussion of financial regulatory reform in June
2009, with the publication of a blueprint docu-
ment by the executive branch, in an environment
that was essentially post-financial crisis. By con-
trast, the EU is still in the midst of a financial crisis
even as it has started a number of long-term finan-
cial reform efforts.
A second factor associated with the difference in
timing is the difference in EU and US legislative
processes. In Washington, all issues of financial
reform (except housing finance which was kept
separate, prompting vocal protests from many in
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WHEN MAKING A TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON of
financial reforms, the first factor that should be
mentioned is the difference between the time
sequence of reforms in the European Union and
the United States. The financial crisis started
simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic, with
the initial disruption of some financial market seg-
ments in August 2007 and the major panic
episode of September-October 2008. But the EU
and US are not at the same stage of policy reac-
tion, and especially regulatory reform, now. At
least four reasons can be identified for this.
The first reason is the fact that beyond the first
weeks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
financial crisis management has so far been, on
the whole, much simpler, swifter and more effec-
tive in the US than in the EU. Specifically, the
stress tests conducted by the US authorities in the
late winter and early spring of 2009, while cer-
tainly far from flawless, triggered a significant
recapitalisation of those institutions at the core of
the financial system, which in turn allowed some
trust to return to the US interbank market in spite
of numerous subsequent failures of smaller
banks.
In the EU, the rebound in bank share prices that
accompanied the US stress tests also allowed a
number of banks to recapitalise under acceptable
conditions, but these tended to be the relatively
stronger ones, rather than those that most needed
an overhaul of their balance sheet. A first wave of
EU-wide stress tests, completed in September
2009, had little if any measurable impact, as the
results were not disclosed to the public and not
open to external scrutiny. In a second wave of
stress tests, completed in July 2010, results were
published but their quality, and correspondingly
the consistency of the stress-testing process
across countries, was later found to be severelythe then-Republican congressional minority) were
discussed at federal level in the context of one
single package of legislation, eventually named
after Senator Christopher Dodd and Representa-
tive Barney Frank. Even though the process was
delayed by several months because of unforeseen
developments in the discussion of the health care
reform bill, it was eventually completed in July
2010, little more than a year after the publication
of the Obama administration’s initial blueprint. By
contrast, in Europe the relevant reform issues
were sliced and diced into a number of separate
legislative texts. A few of these were finalised as
early as 2009 (on harmonisation of deposit insur-
ance regimes, registration of credit rating agen-
cies, and a first revision of the Capital
Requirements Directive, known as CRD2), but
most are either under discussion or not even yet
drafted at the time of writing, including legislation
on the organisation of markets for derivatives and
securities, and on bank crisis management and
resolution. Moreover, these multiple separate
texts at EU level are complemented by significant,
and not always coordinated, legislative activity in
member states, on issues that would typically be
discussed at federal rather than state level in a US
context. Examples include insolvency procedures
for financial institutions and taxation of the finan-
cial sector.
A third contributing factor is the fact that in Europe,
the reform of the financial supervisory architec-
ture was given priority over most other agenda
items, while in the US it was granted much less
prominence than initially envisaged, for example,
in the reform proposals floated by then-Treasury
Secretary Hank Paulson in the spring of 2008. The
starting points were markedly different on both
sides of the Atlantic. In the US, a system of spe-
cialised federal financial supervisory and
regulatory agencies has been in place since at
least the 1930s, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insur-
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ance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency and the prudential supervisory
duties of the Federal Reserve System. In the EU,
while the European Commission plays a key role in
the legislative process, financial regulation and
supervision remained the remit of national author-
ities, which only since the early 2000s started to
regularly meet in EU-level committees (with a
small central secretariat but no ability to impose
decisions on their members). This situation was
perhaps workable in the broadly deregulatory era
that preceded the crisis, but became increasingly
seen as untenable when the crisis made Europe,
like the US, embark on a drive towards reregula-
tion of its financial system, which if carried out in
an uncoordinated manner at national level would
quickly have collided with the commitment to a
single financial market enshrined in the EU treaty.
Thus, in February 2009, a high-level group chaired
by Jacques de Larosière recommended the cre-
ation of EU-level public financial oversight bodies.
The corresponding legislation was given priority in
the legislative process and was eventually
adopted in the early autumn of 2010. Thus, on
January 1, 2011, the EU will have a European
Banking Authority (EBA), a European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA), and a European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
(EIOPA), complemented by a European Systemic
Risk Board. The first three (also known collectively
as the European Supervisory Authorities) will each
be established as an autonomous EU agency.
Even though they start with limited powers and
resources, these new actors can be expected to
play major roles in future EU financial regulatory
developments.
A fourth factor may have been related to the timing
of the renewal of the European Commission, which
was delayed in 2009-10 by considerations related
to the adoption and implementation of the Lisbon
Treaty, a matter essentially unrelated to the finan-
cial and economic crisis. While the Obama
‘The three European Supervisory Authorities will each be established as an autonomous EU
agency. Even though they start with limited powers and resources, these new actors can be
expected to play major roles in future EU financial regulatory developments.’04
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administration took office in January 2009, the
European Commission was a lame-duck through-
out 2009, and it was only in early 2010 that
Michel Barnier replaced Charlie McCreevy as Com-
missioner for the Internal Market and Services, a
portfolio that includes financial regulation. More-
over, Commissioner McCreevy had started his own
term as Commissioner in 2004 assertively pro-
moting a strong deregulatory agenda and was
therefore largely seen as incapacitated when the
events of late 2008 imposed a different policy ori-
entation. This year, he has taken additional blame
for his responsibility for the Irish property bubble
of the 2000s, as Irish finance minister from 1997
to 2004.
REFORM AREAS 
In terms of banking reform, the EU has initially
focused on two limited if significant adjustments.
First, it harmonised key provisions of national
deposit guarantee schemes, as the unfolding of
the financial crisis in October 2008 illustrated the
danger of disruptive arbitrage behaviour that
could be fostered by differences between national
deposit insurance regimes. Second, it mandated
that the originators of securitisation products
should retain a minimum five percent economic
interest so as to keep them incentivised to con-
tinuously monitor the corresponding credit risks.
This latter legislation (CRD2) was adopted in
2009 and is a relatively rare occurrence of a finan-
cial regulatory reform that was adopted first in the
EU, and then in the US in a near-identical form as
part of the Dodd-Frank Act.
In 2010, the EU adopted additional legislation
(known as CRD3) which aims at constraining the
remuneration patterns that banks may adopt for
their traders and executives. The limitations are
on the structure of remuneration packages rather
than on the  amounts paid. This has so far not had
an equivalent in the US, predictably leading to
‘In spite of the failure of coordination seen in the Fortis Bank case in early October 2008, no
credible policy framework has yet been introduced in the EU for addressing cross-border banking
crises, even though the level of cross-border integration is very high.’
complaints by the EU financial industry that it has
been put at a competitive disadvantage.
The initial Capital Requirements Directive was
adopted in 2006 and was largely based on the
Basel 2 capital accord, unlike in the US where cap-
ital requirements have so far remained primarily
set on a national basis. The finalisation in Sep-
tember 2010 of the Basel 3 capital accord, and its
endorsement in November by G20 leaders at their
Seoul summit, open the way for new EU capital
requirements legislation, not yet drafted but
already known as CRD4. It remains to be seen how
fully Basel 3 will be endorsed by CRD4, especially
the leverage ratio which did not exist in Basel 2
and has met much opposition from prominent
European financial firms.
As in the US, resolution authorities and processes
are an important part of the crisis management
framework in the EU. However, in the EU, corporate
and bankruptcy laws are set at national level, and
there is no EU-level banking charter, which makes
harmonisation in this area more difficult. In spite
of the failure of coordination that was seen in the
Fortis Bank case in early October 2008 (which
saw unilateral nationalisation of that bank’s Dutch
operations by the government of the Netherlands,
while most operations in Belgium and Luxem-
bourg were taken over by BNP Paribas), no credi-
ble policy framework has yet been introduced in
the EU for addressing cross-border banking crises,
even though the level of cross-border integration is
very high, to the extent that in many EU countries
most of the banking sector is in foreign (but
almost exclusively EU) hands. The European Com-
mission’s suggestions on the design of national
resolution funds, published in May 2010, have so
far been met with skepticism or indifference by
several member states. Draft legislation on crisis
resolution and management is expected in early
2011 and may prove one of the more controver-
sial items of the current EU legislative agenda.05
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On the whole, Europeans have been so far reluc-
tant to envisage additional requirements for what
the financial jargon designates as systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs). Likewise,
the debate on whether to mandate the separation
of certain functions from banking groups, which
in the US resulted in the adoption of the ‘Volcker
Rule’ under which banks were supposed to divest
or close proprietary trading activities, has neither
been actively addressed yet in most countries,
nor at EU level.
Another big set of possible reforms affects market
structures, including the proposed European
Market Infrastructure Legislation (EMIL) and a
revision of the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID). Here the initial proposals sug-
gest a willingness on the part of the European
Commission to limit as much as possible the dif-
ferences between the European policy framework
and that adopted in the US as part of the Dodd-
Frank Act, in part out of concern about the poten-
tial harmful effect of regulatory arbitrage. On the
face of it, it would thus seem that this is an area
where the US effectively set a transatlantic stan-
dard by moving first. However, it should be noted
that the eventual legislation could end up being
somewhat different from the European Commis-
sion’s initial proposals.
The regulation of private equity and hedge funds,
in the EU through the Alternative Investment Fund
Managers (AIFM) Directive, has given rise to con-
siderable expense of political energy. This project
originated before the crisis and the legislation was
only adopted in the autumn of 2010 after lengthy
debates in the European Parliament. The final ver-
sion is significantly less radical than initially
envisaged and will result in the registration of
most funds with securities authorities as well as
public disclosure obligations. Somewhat similar
provisions are currently envisaged in the US as
part of the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Rating agencieswere not regulated in the EU until
the crisis; registration requirements were placed
on them by 2009 legislation. However, Commis-
sioner Barnier has made it clear that he consid-
ered this insufficient, and that a more restrictive
approach was needed. The corresponding new leg-
islation is currently in a public consultation phase
and will be further debated in 2011. One key
aspect of this discussion is if the eventual legis-
lation will allow rating agencies to keep a globally
uniform methodology, even as they are directly
regulated in an increasing number of separate
jurisdictions.
In accounting, the European Commission has
repeatedly exerted pressure on the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the
Trustees of the IFRS Foundation, which hosts the
IASB, most visibly in October 2008, when the IASB
in a politically charged atmosphere had to adopt
an amendment allowing banks to reclassify
assets across accounting categories, and in Octo-
ber 2010 for the appointment of a new IASB Chair.
However, this has not so far resulted in the con-
sideration of new legislation in this area. The Com-
mission has also recently launched a public
consultation on reform of the auditingsector, but
it is as yet unclear what legislative proposals may
result from this process.
CHALLENGES AHEAD
Several challenges loom in addition to the complex-
ity of the EU legislative programme, most of which
remains to be completed. Only three are mentioned
here, with no pretense of being exhaustive.
One immediate challenge is the establishment of
the three new European Supervisory Authorities
(EBA, ESMA and EIOPA), which are scheduled to
start work on January 1, 2011 but whose senior
management (chairs and chief executives) have
not been appointed at the time of writing. The ini-
tial activities of these new bodies will be crucial
in establishing their credibility and enabling the
future development of their responsibilities. A par-
ticular concern is their governance framework,
which centres on supervisory boards formed of
member-state representatives and in which the
adequate consideration of the EU interest, as
opposed to diplomatic arrangements among
individual countries, cannot be taken for granted. 06
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A perhaps less pressing, but no less important,
challenge is the definition of a credible policy
framework for the management and resolution of
cross-border banking crises, a discussion which
is unlikely to be put to an end by the legislative
proposals expected from the European Commis-
sion in the first half of 2011. In the global context,
the absence of such a framework, in spite of the
discussions fostered by the Financial Stability
Board on international SIFIs, is likely to result in
more independently capitalised and funded
national subsidiaries, whose assets can be ring-
fenced in a relatively straightforward way in the
event of a crisis. However, such a model, which
has largely been adopted (at least for retail bank-
ing activities) by leading international banking
groups such as Citi, HSBC or Santander, sits
uneasily with the commitment to a single market
for financial services within the EU. In April 2010,
the IMF proposed the introduction of an EU-level
bank resolution authority, but this proposal has
not yet attracted a critical mass of support in the
EU policy community.
On a broader level, the EU faces the challenge of
strengthening its capacity to produce high-quality
rules for an increasingly complex financial
system. This is partly, but not only, a question of
adequate resources. In the two decades before the
financial crisis, the EU was able to rely on a
momentum towards global convergence that was
largely driven by the private sector in an environ-
ment of deregulation and provided a powerful
external engine for intra-EU harmonisation. But
the context has been radically transformed during
the crisis. The shift towards reregulation on both
sides of the Atlantic and the increasing multipo-
larity of global finance, with the rise of emerging
economies as major centres of financial activity,
make the prospect of global convergence of finan-
cial rules more elusive. In this new environment,
the EU will have to devote more effort to define its
own model of financial regulation, which on many
aspects cannot refer to a global standard that
does not, or no longer, exists. The creation of the
European Supervisory Authorities, if successful,
can contribute to the emergence of a distinctively
European regulatory philosophy that would be
more than just a compromise among member
states’ positions. But this can probably only be a
gradual and relatively slow process. 
‘The definition of a credible policy framework for the management and resolution of cross-border
banking crises is a discussion that is unlikely to be put to an end by the legislative proposals
expected from the European Commission in the first half of 2011.’